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Abstract
Phishing is a growing threat to Internet users and causes billions of dollars in damage every year. In this paper, 
we present a theoretical yet practical model to study this threat in a formal manner. While it is folklore 
knowledge that a successful phishing attack entails creating messages that are indistinguishable from the 
natural, expected messages by the intended victim, this concept has not been formalized. Our model captures 
phishing in terms of this indistinguishability between the natural and phishing message distributions. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first study that places phishing on a concrete theoretical framework and offers a 
new perspective to analyze this threat. We propose metrics to analyze the success probability of a phishing attack 
taking into account the input used by a phisher and the work involved to create deceptive email messages. 
Finally, we describe and study a new class of phishing attacks called collaborative spear phishing that may stem 
from the latest threat posed by the Epsilon email breach in the recent past and point out fundamental flaws in the 
current email-based marketing business model. In this sense, our study is very timely and presents new and 
emerging trends in phishing. 
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INTRODUCTION
Phishing is an example of a social engineering threat aimed at gleaning sensitive information such as user 
names, passwords and financial information from unsuspecting victims. Attacks are typically carried out via 
communication channels such as email or instant messaging by masquerading as legitimate and trustworthy 
entities. Being a social engineering attack, most studies of this threat have focussed on understanding the 
techniques used by phishers, devising clever strategies to thwart these attacks and the human factors associated 
with phishing. In this paper, we deviate from this empirical approach and propose a theoretical yet practical 
model that captures the dynamics of this threat. A novel feature of our security model is that it captures the 
inherent human factor and consequently complements the empirical study of phishing. 
Our first contribution in this paper is the development of a theoretical framework for phishing. Our model is also 
very practical and designed to study of a large class of phishing attacks including the non-traditional, but latest 
threats such as the Android Market fake banking apps (Slashdot, 2010). It is well known that a successful 
phishing attack entails creating messages that are indistinguishable from the natural, expected messages by the 
intended victim. Firstly, we formalize this notion in the broadest sense possible to encompass a wide range of 
attacks. Our model captures the dynamics of phishing in terms of indistinguishability between the natural and 
phishing message distributions. From the perspective of a phisher, one can view the creation of a phishing 
message as an attempt to embed a deceptive message within an innocent looking email or instant message. To 
this end, we treat the problem to be “spiritually” similar to the problem of Steganography. Our motivation stems 
from the observation that while the goal in Steganography is to create an innocent looking message with a 
hidden payload without arousing the suspicion of any eavesdropper, a phisher tries to create an “innocent” 
looking message with a hidden (malicious) payload without arousing suspicion even from the recipient. Our 
work brings out a hidden connection between Steganography and Phishing and we hope that this connection will 
lead to new perspectives on phishing research. 
Secondly, we propose metrics to measure the success probability of a phishing detection algorithm and 
consequently the success probability of a phishing attempt. We also define the notion of overhead as the ratio of 
the amount of work done by a phisher to the payoff. This notion of overhead will be useful when we analyse the 
impact of the Epsilon email breach and the associated payoff for the phishers.  
Finally, we describe a new class of phishing attacks, called collaborative spear phishing, an advanced class of 
spear phishing that may stem from the latest threat posed by the Epsilon email breach in the recent past. A 
server breach at the Internet marketing company Epsilon, a unit of Alliance Data Systems Corporation, exposed 
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the names and email addresses of millions of people (News/Technology, 2011) across different organizations. 
This breach is being described as the worst of its kind by the media (Information Week, 2011), particularly since 
the breach apparently lasted for months despite warnings of targeted attacks against email service providers. We 
also  point out some of the fundamental flaws in the current email-based marketing business model, which is a 
by-product of service industrialization. Thus, our study is very timely and presents new and emerging trends in 
phishing. 
PRIOR WORK 
Phishing is primarily a social engineering attack and has attracted a lot of research interest in this context. Most 
studies of phishing have focussed on understanding the techniques used by phishers, devising clever strategies 
to thwart these attacks and the human factors associated with this threat.  
Dhamija et al. (Dhamija et al., 2006) and Downs et al. (Downs et al., 2006) studied the factors affecting the 
success of different malicious strategies used by phishers in an effort to build systems better capable of 
thwarting phishing attempts. The impact of social networking websites on phishing was studied by Jagatic et al. 
(Error! Reference source not found.) who found that Internet users may be over four times as likely to 
become victims if they are solicited by someone appearing to be a known acquaintance. Some of the strategies 
devised to thwart phishing attacks mentioned in the literature include: Dynamic Security Skins (Error! 
Reference source not found.) that allows a remote web server to prove its identity in a way that is easy for a 
human user to verify and hard for an attacker to spoof; Detecting phishing emails and websites (Fette et al., 
2007) using machine learning techniques; Web Wallet(Wu et al., 2006), a browser sidebar which users can use 
to submit their sensitive information online; password management and website-login innovations (Yee and 
Sitaker, 2006) and Cantina, a novel, content-based approach to detecting phishing web sites, based on 
information retrieval and text mining algorithms (Zhang et al., 2007)]. Another line of research (Wu et al., 2006, 
Zhang et al., 2007) focuses on the evaluation of anti-phishing tools and their effectiveness.  
A graph-theoretic model to analyse the effort expended by a phisher to launch an attack was studied by 
Jakobsson (Jakobsson, 2005). A phishing attack was modelled using a graph in which nodes correspond to 
knowledge and edges captured traversal from one node to another. Edges were associated with costs to reflect 
the effort of the phisher. This paper also defined a new attack approach called the context aware phishing attack 
using a method called identity linking - determining the correspondence between identities and email addresses 
of a victim.  
Our model is designed to capture the dynamics of every facet of the phishing threat and not isolated to 
measuring the effort expended by the phisher. Furthermore, we describe attacks such as collaborative spear 
phishing that are far more complex than the context aware attack and thus subsumes the earlier attack put forth 
by Jakobsson (Jakobsson, 2005).  
Notations and Definitions 
For a probability distribution P with support X, we use the notation P[x] to denote the probability that P assigns 
to . A random variable X is a function over a sample space , , for some set S and we say that 
the random variable X takes values in the set S. The probability distribution on S described by the random 
variable X is denoted by . 
 
Statistical Distance 
We use statistical distance as the measure of distance between two random variables and the probability 
distributions described by these random variables. The statistical distance is the largest possible difference 
between the probabilities that two probability distributions can assign to the same event. Shoup (Shoup, 2009) 
presents a detailed treatment of statistical distance and its properties. 
Definition 
Let X and Y be random variables which both take values in a finite set S with probability distributions  and 
. The statistical distance between X and Y is defined as  
                    
 
So, two random variables (and the corresponding probability distributions) X and Y are said to be -close if 
. This notion of -closeness will be useful to us when we talk about the two distributions – natural 
and phishing – being close to each other capturing the notion of indistinguishability. 
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THE PHISHING MODEL 
In this section, we describe our phishing model as depicted by Figure 1 built on the Steganography security 
model presented by Cachin (Cachin, 1998). We use the notion of a communication channel to capture email, 
instant and other means of communication. For the purpose of our discussion here, let us use the example of 
email communication. Let us consider an individual’s email inbox. The phishing problem specifies two message 
distributions corresponding to the two sources of messages that can find their way to that individual’s email 
inbox: The Natural (N) and the Phishing (P) message distributions. The two source distributions are shown on 
the left as two black boxes. Typically, we are unaware of the exact probability distributions associated with 
these input sources and will treat them as such in our description. The individual’s inbox normally receives 
messages from the Natural distribution (switch is set to 0) corresponding to the phisher being inactive. The 
natural distribution is meant to capture the distribution of messages that a person expects to see. When the 
phisher is active (switch is set to 1) s/he receives phishing messages. The algorithm used by the phisher operates 
on some input stream to create the deceptive messages. The Distinguisher algorithm D is tasked with being able 
to distinguish between the messages from these two distributions and essentially protect the user from being 
phished. Often, the receiver of the email plays the role of the distinguisher D although Figure 1 depicts the 
distinguisher algorithm D to be distinct from the receiver. In real life, the receiver along with the software tools, 
browser toolbar extensions, and spam/phisher filters collectively form the Distinguisher algorithm. The 
bidirectional arrow between the Distinguisher algorithm D and the receiver is meant to signify this relationship 
between these entities. The arrow out of the receiver pointing to output/action symbolizes the act of clicking on 
a link or acting upon the instructions in the received message, whether natural or phishing.  
Figure 1: The Phishing Model. 
Evaluating the Success of a Phishing Attempt 
The success of a phishing attempt is measured by the intended victim’s ability to distinguish between “natural” 
and “phishing” messages over the communication channel. To characterize natural communication we need to 
define and formalize the communication channel. We follow the standard terminology used in the literature 
(Hopper et al., 2002, Cachin, 1998) to define communication channels. We let  denote an 
alphabet and treat the communication channel as a family of random variables . These channel 
distributions model a history-dependent notion of channel data that captures the notion of real-life 
communication. As an example, if E were to represent the set of the “email alphabet” and  the history of 
emails received by a person thus far, then   represents the random variable that captures the probability 
distribution of the person’s email inbox at that point in time. In our model, we have captured the history 
dependence of communication and an individual’s expectance to “see” a message in his inbox. 
In evaluating the success of a phishing attempt, we need to take into consideration the amount of randomness 
present in a person’s email inbox. We use min-entropy as the measure of this randomness. The min-entropy of a 
random variable , taking values in a set , is the quantity 
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We say that a communication channel (such as an email inbox) has min-entropy  if for all , 
, We would like an individual’s inbox, for all histories, to have some non-zero randomness, i.e, 
. This randomness parameter is designed to capture the diversity of the messages present in a person’s 
inbox. As an example, if someone were to receive only one particular kind of email, then there is no randomness 
present in this communication scheme. The study of phishing on such a communication channel is not as 
interesting since the success probability of a phishing attempt in this situation is very small. 
Let us now discuss the success probability of the Distinguisher algorithm D in being able to detect a phishing 
message. Let us overload the notation and let P denote the phishing algorithm as well as the distribution of the 
phishing messages produced by it. We now define the advantage of the Distinguisher D over the phishing 
algorithm P as:  
  
where m is the message to be distinguished and D(m) = success is the event that the Distinguisher D was 
successful in identifying a phishing message. Observe that any Distinguisher algorithm has an advantage of ½ in 
being able to detect a phishing message by merely flipping a fair coin. Hence, we need to look at the absolute 
value of the difference between the success probability of D from ½.  
An alternative definition for the advantage of the Distinguisher D over the phishing algorithm P is obtained 
from the observation that the total variation distance between two probability measures N and P is the largest 
possible difference between the probabilities that these two probability distributions can assign to the same 
event, in particular to the event D(m) = success. 
  
where N and P are the natural and the phishing message distributions respectively and  represents the 
messages in the message set M (the user’s inbox). Our model captures phishing in terms of this 
indistinguishability between the natural and phishing message distributions. 
We can now define the capacity C of an individual to shield him/her from a phishing attack as: 
   (3) 
this maximum taken over all Distinguisher algorithms D available at the individual’s disposal. This definition 
captures the different software tools such as browser toolbars, add-ons and other installed tools that one might 
use to defend against phishing. 
We can now derive the measure for evaluating the success probability SP of a phishing attempt P as: 
  .    (4) 
We say that a user is  from a phishing attack if for all his email-inboxes with min-entropy , we 
have . 
The overhead of a phisher is judged by the relation between the amount of work done by a phisher and the 
payoff. We adopt the ratio o = w/p as a measure for overhead. Obviously, if the payoff is high and the work 
done is low, then the overhead is low. This measure is useful in comparing the damage caused by different 
phishing attacks. 
In this section, we discuss the different parameters that contribute towards the work done by a phisher. Drake et. 
al, present an anatomy of a phishing email (Drake et al., 2004) where they enumerate the different tricks used by 
phishers in an attempt to create deceptive messages that are indistinguishable from the original messages. The 
most important (and expensive to acquire) of these parameters are the personally identifiable information (PII) 
such as name, email address, the final four digits of an account number, year of expiration etc. The other costs 
associated with work are technical in nature, i.e., creating similar sounding domain names such as tax-
revenue.com, ebaybuyerprotection.com, creating emails that appear to come from legitimate “From:” email 
address, designing the structure and content of the email, creating a plausible premise, using Javascript event 
handlers, redirection, etc. We define work to comprise essentially of two main parts – work done in collecting 
PII and the technical work, i.e, .  
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COLLABORATIVE SPEAR PHISHING 
In this section we introduce a new class of phishing attacks, that we call collaborative spear phishing. We wish 
to shed light on this new class of phishing attacks that may become popular as a result of the latest server breach 
at the email marketing giant Epsilon. This attack is an advanced class of spear phishing that a phisher may 
develop using collaborative filtering techniques described below. In April 2011, a server breach at the Internet 
marketing company Epsilon, a unit of Alliance Data Systems Corporation, exposed the names and email 
addresses of millions of people (News/Technology, 2011)]. While a complete list of all the companies affected 
by the breach is not yet known, roughly 50 companies are said to be on that list, including Best Buy, Citibank, 
Disney, JPMorgan Chase, The Home Shopping Network, Hilton, Marriott and the College Board. This breach is 
being described as the worst of its kind by the media (Information Week, 2011).  
Collaborative filtering is the process of filtering for information or patterns using techniques involving 
collaboration among multiple data sources. Commonly used to infer purchase statistics by implementing 
recommendation algorithms for item recommendation by Amazon and other online retailers, this technique can 
now be used to launch highly advanced phishing attacks. While any breach that leaks personally identifiable 
information is a blessing to phishers, this particular breach at Epsilon is much more so. In the context of this 
breach, a phisher might now try to infer potential accounts that an individual may have with organizations using 
information that he already possesses. Furthermore, it gives a plausible premise that a phisher may use to hide 
his tracks. Observe that the breach at Epsilon leaked much more information than just personally identifiable 
information – It leaked the relationships that an individual with different organizations. The phisher is able to 
observe that a particular account is affiliated with a number of organizations and hence is able to filter for more 
information than s/he could otherwise.  
As a quick example, we use a very simple Item-to-Item recommendation algorithm to illustrate this attack. The 
table below captures Alice, Bob and Emily’s relationship with three organizations. A Yes in the table below 
corresponds to the affirmative knowledge that a phisher has obtained (Using the Epsilon database) about an 
individual’s relationship with that organization and No (no knowledge) corresponds to the lack of this 
knowledge. 
Table 1: Collaborative Phishing 
 
Name Best 
Buy 
Citibank JPMorgan 
Chase 
Alice Yes No Yes 
Bob No Yes Yes 
Emily No Yes No 
 
The cosine between Best Buy and Citibank is obtained by: 
 
The cosine between Best Buy and JPMorgan Chase is obtained by:
 
 
 
The cosine between Citibank and JPMorgan Chase is obtained by:
 
 . 
Hence, a phisher armed with the knowledge that a particular individual who has an account with Best Buy can 
make an educated guess that h/she may possibly have an account with JPMorgan Chase as well. This makes 
good sense because many Best Buy Credit accounts are indeed handled by JPMorgan Chase. While we have 
used a very elementary algorithm for the sake of exposition, a motivated phisher could use an elaborate 
collaborative filtering algorithm such as Slope One (Lemire and Maclachlan, 2005) to improve the success of 
this attack. While the context-aware attack proposed by Jakobsson (Jakobsson, 2005) uses the concept of 
identity-linking to launch phishing attacks, our proposed attack is not only context-aware but also is capable of 
extrapolating for information that the phishers don’t yet have. 
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In this paragraph, we point out some of the fundamental flaws in the current email-based marketing business 
model, which we believe is a by-product of service industrialization - treating services as an industrial process. 
By placing the personally identifiable information of millions of customers under the control of one 
organization, such as Epsilon, the overhead for the phisher is dramatically reduced – The work is diminished 
and the payoff is maximised. Furthermore, the phishers can now send targeted emails to their victims thereby 
making sure that these emails are out of the hands of the phishing research community. They can also ensure 
guaranteed delivery of their phishing emails by spoofing the correct “From” email addresses that most people 
have saved in their address books. Gary Warner (CyberCrime and doing Time, 2011) has an elaborate 
discussion of such targeted phishing attacks. 
CONCLUSION 
Our primary goal in this paper was to present a treatment of phishing in a formal theoretical framework. Our 
model captures the dynamics of phishing in terms of indistinguishability between the natural and phishing 
message distributions. We propose metrics to analyze the success probability of a phishing attack which takes 
into account the input parameters used by a phisher and the associated work involved to create deceptive email 
messages. Finally, we present a new class of phishing attacks, called collaborative spear phishing which is an 
advanced class of spear phishing that may stem from the latest threat posed by the Epsilon email breach in the 
recent past. We also point out some of the fundamental flaws in the current email-based marketing business 
model, which is a by-product of service industrialization. In this sense, our study is very timely and presents 
new and emerging trends in phishing. We hope that our model will help shed some more light on the threats 
posed by phishing. 
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